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We are grateful to the editors of  the Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly for allowing us toput together this special edition on ‘Law and Emotions’. But what is so special about
it? The very existence of  such a field of  study may appear at first sight to be counter-
intuitive; as has been so often pointed out, law and emotion have traditionally been seen as
polar opposites, the former being based on ‘reason’ and the latter on ‘feeling’.1 However,
this has been shown to be a false dichotomy in a number of  respects, being an accurate
reflection neither of  the way the law is structured and administered,2 nor of  the way
emotion works,3 nor indeed of  the way humans live.4 Indeed, such is the influence of
emotion on human behaviour that the relevance of  emotion to law has been said to be ‘a
point so obvious as to make its articulation seem almost banal’.5 Be that as it may, the study
of  law and emotions, though now reasonably well established in America, is less familiar to
students and practitioners of  law, or indeed academics working in the area, on this side of
the Atlantic, and this collection is therefore designed to provide an insight into the subject. 
The aim of  this introduction is threefold. First of  all, it will outline the history of  law
and emotion studies and the directions in which it has developed. Next, it will demonstrate
how the present collection of  essays fits into the overall picture. Finally, it will attempt to
assess where the study of  law and emotions stands at present, and to sketch out possible
directions for future development with particular reference to the UK and Irish experience.
The intersection of  law and emotions has never been entirely ignored by scholars, but
up until recent years it has been addressed in a somewhat piecemeal fashion. Thus, for
instance, the role of  anger as a mitigating factor has always been of  relevance to criminal
1 Terry Maroney, ‘Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of  an Emerging Field’ (2006) 30 Law and Human
Behavior 119, at 120.
2 K Abrams, ‘The Progress of  Passion’ (2002) 100 Michigan Law Review 1602.
3 In particular, it takes little or no cognisance of  the important role of  cognition in emotion: see Tim Dalgleish
and Mick Power (eds), Handbook of  Cognition and Emotion (John Wiley & Sons 1999); Martha Nussbaum,
Upheavals of  Thought: The Intelligence of  Emotions (CUP 2001); Robert Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and
Choice (OUP 2006)
4 Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (Bloomsbury 1996).
5 Maroney (n 1) 20.
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law in the context of  the defence of  provocation,6 and fear in the context of  the defence
of  duress has been similarly recognised.7 The law of  tort has its cases on so-called ‘nervous
shock’,8 and the recovery of  damages for disappointment has always been a topic of
interest to contract lawyers.9 Much of  the law of  criminal evidence can be seen as a
mechanism for controlling the emotional prejudices of  juries,10 and the American Realist
movement even touched on the role of  emotion in judging.11
However, it was not until the very end of  the last century that an attempt was made to
draw some of  these topics together. Following a conference on law and emotions at the
University of  Chicago Law School in May 1998,12 a collection of  essays edited by Susan
Bandes, The Passions of  Law, was published in 1999,13 the aims being to demonstrate to
readers the relevance of  emotion to the study of  law and to provoke further debate on the
subject.14 In introducing the collection, Bandes drew attention to the curious paradox
whereby emotion pervades the law, but convention demands that it be sidelined on the
grounds that the true preserve of  law is not emotion but reason. Though emotion might
have a place in the conventional account, she observed, it was a very circumscribed one, the
assumption being it was only of  relevance in the criminal context and to laypeople without
legal training.15 In seeking to challenge that conventional account, 13 essays were produced,
ranging broadly over a number of  different axes. Thus, a wide range of  emotions were
considered, including shame, disgust, remorse, revenge, anger, romantic love, fear and
cowardice.16 Law and emotions were seen to relate together in a number of  different ways,
with the law not only reacting to emotion, but sometimes expressing it, or even creating it.17
Another strength of  the collection was said to be the way in which some at least of  the
contributors were prepared to draw on a more sophisticated and scientifically based
understanding of  the emotions themselves, as opposed to the old view of  emotions in
terms of  mere feeling or ‘affect’.18 As might be expected from a pioneering work of  this
sort, there were a number of  drawbacks identified: for example, there was still too much of
a criminal flavour to the collection19 and too much emphasis on the negative emotions.20
As well as that, it was argued that more could have been done to engage with the debates
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6 Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (Clarendon Press 1992). For an early study in the field drawing on
contemporary physiological and psychological research, see Peter Brett, ‘The Physiology of  Provocation’
[1970] Criminal Law Review 634.
7 Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton University Press 1989); Lawrence Newman and Lawrence Weitzer,
‘Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law’ (1957) 30 Southern California Law Review 313, at 326–30.
8 Harvey Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm: Reshaping the Boundaries of  Liability (Hart Publishing 2009).
9 Nelson Enonchong, ‘Breach of  Contract and Damages for Mental Distress’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 617.
10 Victor J Gold, ‘Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence’ (1984) UC Davis Law Review 59;
Geoffrey P Kramer et al, ‘Pre-trial Publicity, Judicial Remedies and Jury Bias’ (1990) 14 Law and Human
Behavior 409.
11 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Brentano’s 1930), ch 13, cited in Terry Maroney, ‘The Persistent
Cultural Script of  Judicial Dispassion’ (2011) 99 California Law Review 629. 
12 Maroney (n 1) 22 fn 11.
13 Susan Bandes, The Passions of  Law (New York University Press 1999).
14 Ibid 7 and 11, cited by Maroney (n 1) 42.
15 Bandes (n 13) 1–2.
16 Kathy Abrams, ‘The Progress of  Passion’ (2002) 100 Michigan Law Review 1602, 1603–07.
17 Ibid 1608–12.
18 Ibid 1610.
19 Ibid 1613.
20 Ibid 1613–14.
taking place within primary emotions scholarship.21 Nevertheless, The Passions of  Law
deserves to be ranked as a seminal work, not least because for the first time it sought to
present law and emotions as a wood rather than a mere collection of  trees.
Since then the literature on law and emotions has expanded in many different
directions,22 and has engaged with many different areas of  the law, including criminal law,23
tort,24 property law,25 family law,26 constitutional law,27 victims’ rights,28 refugee law,29
judging30 and even the law of  burial disputes.31 A comprehensive review of  this literature
would now fill many volumes, but, even so, Maroney argues that it is still a moot point as
to what extent law and emotions can be called a recognised ‘discipline’ in its own right.32 A
number of  reasons can be given for this: there is no consensus as to what counts as law and
emotions scholarship;33 approaches to the scientific and empirical study of  emotions vary
enormously;34 and not all those who work within the field of  law and emotions even realise
that they are doing so.35 Nevertheless, she concludes that, given the inevitability of
emotion’s influence on law, and vice versa, the topic is well worth continued investigation,
not least in the hope that greater knowledge of  the subject will enable it to put down firmer
methodological and epistemological roots.
As the literature demonstrates,36 and not least the present collection, there are a number
of  different ways in which the interrelationship of  law and emotions can be studied. The first
of  these is the one adopted in the previous paragraph, which considers the ways in which
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21 Maroney (n 1) 122.
22 See below, nn 36–44.
23 Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum, ‘Two Conceptions of  Emotion in Criminal Law’ (1996) 96 Columbia Law
Review 269; John Stannard, ‘Sticks. Stones and Words: Emotional Harm in the English Criminal Law’ (2010)
74 Journal of  Criminal Law 533; Eimear Spain, The Role of  Emotions in Criminal Law Defences (CUP 2011);
Susanne Karstedt et al, Emotions, Crime and Justice (Hart Publishing 2011).
24 Harvey Teff, Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm: Reshaping the Boundaries of  Liability (Hart Publishing 2009);
Laura E Little, ‘Just a Joke: Defamatory Humor and Incongruity’s Promise’ (2012) 21 Southern California
Interdisciplinary Law Journal 99.
25 Peter H Huang, ‘Reasons within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining’ (2000) 79
Oregon Law Review 435; Lorna Fox, Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies (Hart Publishing 2007).
26 Janet Weinstein and Ricardo Weinstein, ‘“I Know Better than That”: The Role of  Emotions and the Brain in
Family Law Disputes’ (2005) 7 Journal of  Law and Family Studies 351; Jennifer Schweppe, ‘Best to Agree to
Disagree: Parental Discord, Children’s Rights and the Question of  Immunisation’ (2008) 37 California
Common Law World Review 147; Phillip Shaver et al, ‘What’s Love Got to Do with It? Insecurity and Anger
in Attachment Relationships’ (2009) 16 Virginia Journal of  Social Policy and Law 491 
27 Laura E Little, ‘Loyalty, Gratitude and the Federal Judiciary’ (1995) 44 American University Law Review 699;
Laura E Little, ‘Envy and Jealousy: A Study of  Separation of  Powers and Judicial Review’ (2000) 52 Hastings
Law Journal 47; Terry Maroney, ‘Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law’ (2009) 62 Vanderbilt Law
Review 851. 
28 Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of  Third Parties (Hart
Publishing 2009).
29 Jane Herlihy, ‘The Psychology of  Seeking Protection’ (2009) 21 International Journal of  Refugee Law 171.
30 Terry Maroney, ‘The Persistent Cultural Script of  Judicial Dispassion’ (Vanderbilt Law and Economics
Research Paper no 10-28 2011); Terry Maroney, ‘Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior’ (2011) 99
California Law Review 1481; Terry Maroney, ‘Angry Judges’ (2012) 65 Vanderbilt Law Review 1207.
31 Heather Conway and John Stannard, ‘The Honours of  Hades: Death, Emotion and the Law of  Burial
Disputes’ (2011) 34 University of  New South Wales Law Journal 860.
32 Maroney (n 1) 136.
33 Ibid 123–25.
34 Ibid 136 (a ‘wobbly compendium of  thought’).
35 Ibid 124.
36 Ibid 126.
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emotions are or should be reflected in different areas of  legal doctrine;37 this is perhaps the
one that is most immediately accessible to lawyers. The second is emotion-centred and
focuses on the way in which the law responds to or reflects particular discrete emotions such
as love, hate, fear, anger and so on;38 this is an obvious approach, but is hampered to some
extent by the absence of  any generally accepted taxonomy of  emotions.39 The third looks at
particular legal actors such as judges, solicitors, barristers and so on, the aim being to
consider how their work is or should be influenced by emotion;40 much of  the work in this
field so far has concentrated on judges41 and jurors,42 but is of  equal relevance to
practitioners generally.43 Other approaches identified by Maroney include the ‘emotional
phenomenon’ approach (describing particular emotional phenomena and analysing how
these should be reflected in law), the ‘emotion-theory’ approach (examining legal doctrines
and practices in the light of  particular theories of  emotion) and the ‘theory-of-law’ approach
(analysing the emotional theories and presuppositions reflected in particular legal theories).44
This list is by no means exhaustive; thus, for instance, another possible approach is to adopt
an analysis whereby emotion may interact with the law in three different ways, these being:
(1) the response of  law to emotion; (2) the role of  the law in creating and fostering emotion;
and (3) the influence of  emotion in the practice of  the law. And, of  course, it is quite possible
to mix these approaches, for instance, by adopting one particular area of  legal doctrine and
then considering the impact of  particular emotions in that area.
In this collection, we have adopted Maroney’s taxonomy and begin with four articles
which are ‘actor-centred’: Maroney looks at the emotions of  judges, with a particular focus
on judicial anger and its place in the legal system; Doak and Taylor reimagine the sentencing
system to make it more emotionally intelligent – an approach that they argue would benefit
both offenders and victims; Chakraborti and Zempi examine the impact of  the veil ban on
Muslim women, their communities and society in general; and finally, Herlihy and Turner
examine the role of  both asylum seekers and decision makers in the asylum process. We then
proceed to a ‘doctrine-centred’ approach, with Conway and Stannard’s examination of  the
emotional context in which the doctrine of  adverse possession operates; and, finally, we look
to two articles which are ‘emotion-centred’: Spain’s examination of  love and compassion in
the context of  end-of-life decisions; and Abrams and Keren’s examination of  the ability of
legal actors to cultivate resilience in their clients. That said, some papers straddle two or more
areas, but this basic breakdown is a useful starting point for our analysis.
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37 Maroney (n 1).
38 Ibid.
39 For a flavour of  the debate see Silvano Arieti, ‘Cognition and Feeling’ in Magda Arnold (ed), Feelings and
Emotions (Academic Press 1970) 135; Nancy Stein and Keith Oatley (eds), Basic Emotions (L Erlbaum 1992);
Paul Ekman, ‘Basic Emotions’ in Dalgleish and Power (n 3) 45; Alexandra Newen, ‘Classifying Emotion: A
Developmental Account’ (2001) 161 Synthese 1.
40 Maroney (n 1) 126.
41 Abrams (n 15) 1618–19. Much of  Maroney’s own work is in this area; see the works cited at n 30. 
42 Neil R Feigenson, ‘Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis’ (1997) 65 Tennessee Law Review
1; Neil R Feigenson, Legal Blame: How Jurors Think and Talk about Accidents (American Psychological Association
2000); Reid Hastie, ‘Emotions in Jurors’ Decisions’ (2001) 66 Brooklyn Law Review 991; Neil R Feigenson et
al, ‘The Role of  Emotions in Comparative Negligence Judgments’ (2001) 31 Journal of  Applied Social
Psychology 576; David A Bright and Jane Goodman-Delahunty, ‘Gruesome Evidence and Emotion’ (2006)
30 Law and Human Behavior 183. 
43 See the works cited by Maroney (n 1) 133. Mention should also be made of  the concept of  ‘therapeutic
jurisprudence’ coined by Bruce Winick and others: see B J Winick, ‘The Jurisprudence of  Therapeutic
Jurisprudence’ (1997) 3 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 184; see further below, n 48. 
44 Ibid 126.
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In the first article, Terry Maroney begins by observing that, traditionally, the task of
the legal system is to ‘systematically reduce the opportunities for judicial emotion to
insert itself ’. However, she cogently argues that this view of  human emotion is
contrary to ‘virtually everything we know about emotion and its value’ for four key
reasons: first, emotion reveals reasons; second, emotion motivates action in the service
of  reasons; third, emotion enables reason; and, finally, emotion is educable. She argues
that, rather than seeking to suppress judicial emotion, the legal system should rather
aim to regulate it, a process which will both allow judges to deal with the emotional
challenges of  their job, but also ‘selectively integrate those emotions into their
decisional processes’. Using judicial anger as a lens through which this new model is
tested, she observes that anger is ‘quintessentially judicial’ as, once triggered, it
generates a desire to affix blame and assign punishment. However, it can also be
‘deeply threatening to competent judicial performance’. Thus, she concludes, judicial
anger should be regulated, rather than stifled, particularly given the health risks of
emotion suppression. This approach will ‘maximise beneficial iterations of  judicial
anger while minimizing destructive ones’.
Building on Maroney’s observations on the role of  emotions in the legal system
generally, Doak and Taylor note that the perception is that if  the door to emotions is left
ajar, the ‘core normative features of  the legal system of  consistency, certainty and fairness
would be lost in a maelstrom of  emotional outpourings’. However, they go on to observe
that, in the context of  sentencing in particular, ‘emotions matter’ and a more emotionally
intelligent sentencing system would be beneficial for four key reasons: first, it would
strengthen therapeutic justice; second, it would strengthen procedural justice; third, it would
improve the quality of  decision-making; and finally, it would transform the relationships
between victims and offenders. They then examine the ways in which the emotional
narratives of  victims and offenders can be taken into account when determining sentence
through both pre-sentence report and victim personal statements or family impact
statements. The authors admit that, while these innovations have been a step in the right
direction, they do not go far enough and argue that emotions can play an even more central
role within the current parameters of  the criminal justice system. While seeing these steps
as an interim measure, the ultimate aim being a ‘fully-fledged emotionally-intelligent model
of  sentencing’ which would require a significant reconfiguration of  penal ideology, they
argue that these interim steps may well trigger a broader realisation that criminal sentencing
‘ought to perform a wider function than the mere retribution of  wrongs’.
In the past decade, a number of  European countries have imposed restrictions on the
public practice of  Islam and Chakraborti and Zempi examine the emotional impact that veil
ban laws have on Muslim women in Western cultures. They argue that, contrary to public
opinion, where the wearing of  the veil is seen as the mark of  a subjugated woman, the veil
ban is actually a form of  oppression. They introduce us to the key concept of  ummah, which
‘reflects the development of  a robust collective identity among the world’s Muslims’. The veil
ban, which results in both multiple and intersectional discrimination against Muslim women,
alienates women from society and its cumulative effect, they argue, can be to ‘reinforce the
sense of  alienation experienced by members of  the ummah-based community’. Of  perhaps
even more concern, they argue, is the stigmatisation of  such women as criminals, thereby
potentially ‘legitimising’ acts of  violence against them when they are in public. Finally, they
observe, the ban goes beyond Muslim women, but affects the entire Muslim community and
indeed society as a whole, ‘on the basis that [the] law attacks the fundamental value of  liberal
democratic states: the issue of  choice’. Ultimately, they argue that the veil ban ‘compounds
the emotional suffering of  those affected by it on the basis that it communicates a message
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of  institutionalised Islamophobia through formal power structures of  law-making, police
procedure, prosecutorial power and governmental policy’.
Herlihy and Turner then examine the role of  emotions in refugee law, particularly the
emotions of  both the applicant and the decision maker in asylum claims. Drawing on
psychological science, they show how an understanding of  these principles can assist us in
comprehending the experiences of  both sets of  actors in the asylum process. First, they
look at the emotions of  the claimant and how lay theories of  emotions can sometimes lead
to conclusions which are contrary to a psychological understanding of  the experience. They
observe the different way in which individuals process different types of  memory and the
impact that post-traumatic stress disorder can have on the recalling of  such memories.
Relying on psychological theories of  memory and recall, rather than lay theories, they argue,
will improve the asylum process. They then turn to the experiences of  the decision maker,
noting that the subject matter of  asylum claims, involving ‘some of  the most atrocious acts
that humans perpetrate on each other’, can impact on the decision maker in a number of
ways. Particularly interesting is their discussion on the manner in which decision makers
must sometimes ‘tolerate uncertainty’ which adds to the emotional burden of  the work: a
decision maker cannot know if  their decision was correct, or if  they have returned the
claimant to face further torture and persecution. Ultimately, they argue that these crucial
decisions regarding asylum claims must be made in a manner which is both informed and
underpinned by the best available scientific knowledge.
Conway and Stannard take a doctrine-centred approach and begin their analysis of  the
emotional paradoxes of  adverse possession by wryly observing that property lawyers are
generally ‘a serious lot, not prone to feverish bursts of  excitement’. However, one area of
property law which energises even the most staid of  lawyers, along with the population as
a whole, is the doctrine of  adverse possession. The authors begin their examination of  the
doctrine by looking at the manner in which Western cultures value property and observe
that, while society sometimes sees the actions of  a squatter on land as ‘immoral’, the misuse
or neglect of  land by the original owner can also be contrary to the value which we as a
society place on land. They go on to examine a number of  instances of  ‘squatting’ and note
that the actions of  both the squatter and the landowner will impact on the perception of
the squatter in society as a whole. These perceptions are then reflected in the legal system
through the courts and the legislature, which seek to confine the operation of  the doctrine
in a manner which protects the owner. They argue that there is an ‘overwhelming sense’ in
society that adverse possession is both morally and socially wrong and that by shifting the
protection from squatter to landowner, the law is responding to ‘the negative emotions
generated by adverse possession’.
Our final two articles take an emotion-centred approach to this complex area. Spain
examines the topical and legally complex area of  assisted dying, observing that central to
any debate on the issue are ‘the emotions which motivate those involved’. Arguing that the
law should understand emotions before punishing individuals who commit acts while under
their influence, she states that, in the context of  end-of-life decisions, two emotions are
often central to the decision-making process: love and compassion. She then goes on to
discuss the current legal position and particularly examines the role of  the traditional
defences in cases of  assisted dying, observing that no established defence is useful in these
contexts for either policy or theoretical reasons. She then goes on to argue that a new
excusatory defence should be established which recognises the key role that the emotions
of  the defendant play in these cases. This defence would operate where the defendant acted
out of  love or compassion for the victim and reflects the modern evaluative view of
emotions. It would be subject to limitations, however, where the emotion and response were
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‘reasonable and socially justifiable’ and where the medical condition of  the victim was
‘objectively verifiable’ as a terminal or chronic illness. This new defence, she argues, would
exculpate those individuals who act ‘in an understandable way in response to reasonable and
socially acceptable emotions’.
Finally, Abrams and Keren provide a fitting end to our collection, in their analysis of  the
potential of  law to enhance resilience by cultivating positive emotions. They note that legal
actors are slow to use the law to achieve emotional goals, but ultimately argue that positive
affective responses can be achieved by programmatic interventions prescribed by law,
through a sustained process of  habituation. They begin by discussing the literature on
resilience, noting that individuals respond to adversity in very different ways – this ability or
inability to cope and the role of  positive emotions in building resilience to adverse situations
forms the psychological foundation of  their analysis. Drawing on their earlier study on the
ability of  legal actors to cultivate hope,45 they argue that many of  their earlier
understandings reflect ‘insights embodied in the psychological literature’. Observing that
the ability of  an individual to cope effectively is a function of  their connection with
resources in their environment, they argue that the turn to law ‘which is capable of
structuring or regulating relations between individuals and their environments, [is] a
plausible and necessary move’. Once legal actors have established programmes which foster
positive emotions, there may be, they argue, ‘new opportunities for psychologists to
examine the processes by which lawyers and legally structured institutions help to foster
positive emotions among groups who are their clients and beneficiaries’.
Writing in 2004, Stephen Morse predicted that in the long run scholarship on law and
the emotions was likely to have considerably less impact than that on law and economics.46
We have already looked at some of  the reasons for his pessimism, including the enormous
potential breadth of  the topic, the lack of  any ‘standard’ theory of  emotion and the fact
that not everyone engaged in the study of  law and emotions even knows that they are doing
so.47 However, assuming for the purposes of  argument that law and emotions is a topic
worth studying – and for the reasons given above there are good grounds to believe that it
is – there are a number of  challenges which need to be borne in mind if  that study is to
have the impact it deserves.
The first is the need to encourage scholars working in the field both to realise that fact,
and to pool their insights with others. As at least one of  the present editors can testify from
experience, it is all too easy to study law and emotions in a vacuum without being aware of
the work that is going on elsewhere48 – all the more so, given that the field straddles so
many discrete academic disciplines. As we have seen, Terry Maroney and others have done
much in recent years to draw the different threads together, but there is more work to be
done. One useful approach would be for someone to try to draw up a comprehensive
bibliography of  law and emotions, which would then be regularly updated. Another would
be to foster regular contacts between those engaged in the area, in which scholars from
different disciplines could share their insights and inform future work on the subject. This
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45 Kathy Abrams and Hila Keren, ‘Law in the Cultivation of  Hope’ (2007) 95 California Law Review 319.
46 Stephen J Morse, ‘New Neuroscience, Old Problems’ in B Garland (ed), Neuroscience and the Law: Brain, Mind
and the Scales of  Justice (Dana Press 2004) 157, 186 (cited by Maroney (n 1) 133. 
47 See above, nn 33–35.
48 Thus, for instance, eight years before The Passions of  Law came on the scene, David D Wexler and Bruce
Winick brought out their seminal Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press 1991), in which
they argued that law itself  could be seen to function as a therapist or therapeutic agent. However, there has
until recently been little cross-fertilisation between ‘law and emotions’ and ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’, despite
the key relevance of  the latter to Maroney’s ‘legal actors’ approach (nn 40–43).
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has already been done to some extent on the other side of  the Atlantic,49 and there have
recently been similar initiatives in Ireland,50 but there is a lot more room for this sort of
thing if  law and emotions is to find its feet as a discipline in its own right.
Another challenge is the need for lawyers working in the area to be aware of  the
psychological and philosophical debates surrounding the emotions. One major difficulty
that has to be met is that there is no consensus even as to what an emotion is,51 or to how
it relates to kindred concepts such as feeling and affect,52 still less as to the content and
taxonomy of  discrete emotions.53 Again, scholars from a legal background who venture
into the area have to be aware of  the pitfalls of  terminology, with seemingly familiar
concepts such as ‘cognition’ and ‘intention’ having very different meanings in the context
of  psychology and philosophy to those to which they have become accustomed.54 Given
that law and emotions scholarship straddles so many different academic disciplines, each
with its own established jargon, to call for a common vocabulary is perhaps, as Lord
Wilberforce said in another context,55 to cry for the moon, but one who reads in areas with
which he or she is unfamiliar has at least to be aware of  these problems.
The third challenge is the need to write with precision and to ensure that what is said is
rooted in evidence. Law and emotions may sound rather ‘touchy-feely’, but that is no excuse
for academic sloppiness when writing in the area. A scholar who writes about the relevance
of  particular emotions in the legal context should be careful to ensure that he or she can
define what these emotions mean;56 one who writes about the behaviour of  legal actors
must do so by reference to the psychological literature;57 one who writes about the law’s
reaction to emotion in the context of  public opinion must be careful to check what the
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49 Thus, The Passions of  Law itself  had its genesis in a conference held in Chicago in 1998 (see n 12 above), and
in 2007 a further conference was held at Berkeley, California, on the topic ‘Law and the Emotions: New
Directions in Scholarship’ <www.law.berkeley.edu/1111.htm> accessed 18 December 2012. 
50 For instance the interdisciplinary conference on ‘Regulating Emotions’ organised by one of  the present
editors and held in May 2012 under the aegis of  the Emotions and Society Research cluster at the University
of  Limerick, and the Law and Emotions Colloquium held at Queen’s University Belfast in March 2013. 
51 This question was famously raised by William James in his seminal article ‘What is an Emotion?’ (1884) 9 Mind
188, but, as Solomon points out, the debate has gone on since the days of  Plato and Aristotle and has still not
been resolved: Robert C Solomon, ‘The Philosophy of  Emotions’ in Michael Lewis, Jeannette M Haviland-
Jones and Lisa Feldman Barrett (eds), Handbook of  Emotions (3rd edn, Guilford Press 2008) 3; see also Paul E
Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of  Psychological Categories (University of  Chicago Press 1997);
Paul Ekman and Richard J Davidson (eds), The Nature of  Emotion: Fundamental Questions (OUP 1994); Robert
C Solomon, What is an Emotion? (OUP 2003).
52 Ekman and Davidson (n 51) 48–96; Joseph V Brady, ‘Emotion: Some Conceptual Problems and
Psychophysiological Experiments’ in Arnold (n 39) 69, 70; Nancy L Stein, Marc W Hernandez and Tom
Trabasso, ‘Advances in Modeling Emotion and Thought’ in Lewis et al (n 51) 575, 578–80.
53 Ekman and Davidson (n 51) 5–47; Arieti (n 39) 135; Paul Ekman, ‘Basic Emotions’ in Dalgleish and Power
(n 3) 45.
54 Thus ‘cognition’ does not imply conscious appraisal: Andrew Ortony, Gerald L Clore and Alan Collins, The
Cognitive Structure of  Emotions (CUP 1988) 4; Richard S Lazarus, ‘The Cognition–Emotion Debate: A Bit of
History’ in Dalgleish and Power (n 3) 10. Nor does ‘intention’ imply desire or purpose: Peter Goldie, The
Emotions (Clarendon Press 2000) 16; John R Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of  Mind (CUP 1983),
ch 1.
55 In Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL) 844. Lord Wilberforce was talking here
about the problems of  terminology in relation to contractual discharge, but the literature on emotions displays
similar problems.
56 This is not as impossible a task as might at first appear; a lot of  work has been done in defining and classifying
discrete emotions for the purposes of  computer recognition programs: see Roddy Cowie, Ellen Douglas-
Cowie and Cate Cox, ‘Beyond Emotion Archetypes: Databases for Emotion Modelling Using Neural
Networks’ (2005) 18 Neural Networks 371. 
57 The first three articles in the present collection are good examples of  this.
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public actually feels, if  possible on the basis of  empirical evidence.58 One of  the problems
here is that such evidence is not always easy to obtain; one wonders, for instance, whether
some of  the empirical studies done elsewhere, such as the judicial survey referred to in the
essay by Terry Maroney, could be replicated in the context of  the British Isles. But a lot
more work of  this sort needs to be done if  future writings on law and emotions are to be
built on the rock and not on the sand.
One of  the problems with law and emotions, as with any evolving field of  study, is that
it takes time to design new tools for the job and to acquire the necessary skill in using them.
Another problem is the need for those who write on law and emotions to know their way
round a number of  disciplines, including law, philosophy, psychology and sociology; most
of  those who embark on the study of  the topic are grounded in only one of  these, and there
is the ever-present danger that the Jack – or Jill – of  all trades will end up as the master –
or mistress – of  none. Be that as it may, this collection of  essays is offered to the reader in
the hope that it will stimulate an interest and will lead to a more mature appreciation of  a
new and fascinating field of  study.
What is so ‘special’ about law and emotions?
58 See, for instance, the work of  Hough and others, suggesting that public attitudes to crime are not as ‘punitive’
as is often assumed: Julian Roberts and J M Hough, Changing Attitudes to Punishment: Public Opinion, Crime and
Justice (Willan 2002). 
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